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Putting Math in its Place

A Review of Cathy O’Neil’s Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases
Inequality and Threatens Democracy

Nathalie Sinclair1
Simon Fraser University
With its bright yellow cover and its ominous title, this book attracts attention. The
subtitle, “How big data increases inequality and threatens democracy” signals very
strongly that the “math” in question in the title is primarily that which relates to the
statistical and computational means of collecting, analysing and using data. For some
readers, the title might be surprising, because it challenges the typical understanding of
mathematics as an objective and value-neutral discipline. Worse, it claims that
mathematics is significantly involved in creating inequality and compromising
democracy. If it is true, then the answer to the perennial student question, “when am I
ever going to use this?” has now become, “when will it use you?”
There are plenty of people in the humanities and social sciences who critique the sciences
(including mathematics) for their modes of inquiry, which privilege objectivity, precision
and abstraction. Some argue that scientific research ignores the historical, social and
cultural embeddedness of knowledge and ideas, as well as the consequences of objectively
made choices on the health, safety and well-being of humans and the environment. In
many instances, these critiques come from people with very little experience actually
doing science or mathematics, which means they often criticize the disciplines as a whole.
This is not the case with Cathy O’Neil, who has a PhD in mathematics and is very
knowledgeable about the use of big data in many different applied contexts, including the
financial industry. She’s an insider.2 This is precisely what makes her own critique so
powerful: she still loves mathematics and she sees the value in some uses of big data.
However, she has also seen first-hand the misuse of big data in a variety of contexts, and
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In the second chapter, which is entitled “My Journey of Disillusionment”, O’Neil recounts how she went from an
enthusiast to an informed critic. Importantly, her own understanding about the misuse of big data was gained
through participation in meetings that included a diverse range of people, which is a stark contrast to the narrow
swatch of the population tasked with designing and programming the algorithms making use of big data.
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the repercussions of this misuse on the lives of people, many of whom are already
disadvantaged because of their socio-economic status, gender, race, disability or sexual
orientation. In her book, she shows how the three characteristic features of weapons of
math destruction, or WMDs—which are Opacity, Scale and Damage—increase inequality.
The book contains many case studies on the use of big data to make decisions about a
range of topics, including college rankings, targeted advertising and credit ratings. While
all of these case studies are based in the United States, similar effects have also been
documented in Canada (The Montreal Declaration, 2018) and elsewhere in the world
(Noble, 2018). There are two particularly interesting case studies for those working in
education, one of which involves college rankings and the other, found both in the
Introduction and in Chapter 7, which involves evaluating teachers’ performance. In the
latter, O’Neil describes the use of big data in particular jurisdictions in the USA to evaluate
teacher performance (including identifying which teachers to fire). I will describe it in
some detail in order to provide a better sense of O’Neil’s argument as it relates to the use
and abuse of mathematics. To be clear, her point is not that mathematics or algorithms
or data are somehow intrinsically bad. She cites many situations in which they can be
validly used. What she is interested in is why and when they are poorly used and how that
matters to democracy.
In order to use big data to make decisions about things, one needs a model of the
phenomenon in question. If we want to decide which teachers are performing well, we
need a model of what a good teacher is. One model, which has been used in the past, is
that a good teacher is one whose students succeed well on standardised tests. With this
model, which might even grade teachers on a curve, it would be possible to look at the
average marks of a teacher’s students and rank the teachers from worst to best. Because
the model does not require the subjective determination of a principal or colleagues or
students or parents, who might take into account factors such as the teacher’s race and
gender, it may strike many people as refreshingly objective—the same way as choosing
orchestra players by having them audition behind a curtain. However, the model is deeply
flawed: the very same teacher working in very different conditions (with different
students, in a different school, with different colleagues) could get wildly different scores.
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While it had the advantage of being transparent, in that the students’ test scores can be
made available to teachers, the mathematicians hired to create the model decided they
needed proxy data in order to try to account for the complexity of identifying
underperforming teachers.
This gave rise to a new mode, called the value-added model, which was used in New York.
This new model tried to be fairer, by not advantaging teachers who worked in prosperous
neighbourhoods, for example, or who had very few students with learning disabilities in
their classes. Instead of measuring teachers on an absolute scale, the new model tried to
adjust for social inequalities. In order to do this, the new model compared students with
forecasted models of themselves—how should each student be expected to perform on a
test in the future? The students each had a predicted score. If they surpassed the
prediction, their teacher received the credit. This constituted a shift from a primary to a
secondary model; whereas the former involved direct measurement (of averages on test
scores), the latter relied on so-called error terms, which are the gaps between an actual
result and an expected one. This secondary model was derived from a bunch of proxy
statistics that, argues O’Neil, were based on “guesses on top of guesses”. These statistics,
which predicted student success, were based on correlations between a person’s zip code
or their language spoken at home. They were fed into algorithms that weighted a bunch
of factors—where positive reviews by an administrator were vastly outweighed by
statistics deemed more objective. It can become difficult sometimes to remember that
there is a difference between real people and the technical models used to describe them.
A significant problem with this value-added model is that it lacks scalability because it
depends on insufficient data, both in relation to the teacher (n = 1) and the student (n =
30, for most classes). Although there were allowances made for SES and disability, it is
extremely problematic to make predictions about any individual student, because you
cannot run tests on how each child would learn with each different teacher. There are
certainly cases in which such data is available: Google can finish your sentence for you
because it has millions of datasets that show what is likely to happen next when you write
“How are” in a text message. Furthermore, because it receives feedback on what people
actually write, it can adjust its algorithm and tailor it to certain demographics, suggesting
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either ‘How are you?” or “How are things?” Similarly, O’Neil points out how effective
baseball statistics can be; they are based on a large number of observations (of where a
player hits the ball) that can be used to predict future hits (thus enabling outfields to
adjust their positions) and updated in case of changes (the player starts hitting in a
different way or in a different direction).
The algorithms used to identify underperforming teachers could not be trained in the
same way—there was no feedback into the system. Worse, they lacked transparency.
Neither teachers nor district co-ordinators were able to see the algorithm, let alone try to
understand it. After all, the models and algorithms are intellectual property produced by
the mathematicians working for big data companies. O’Neil argues that self-perpetuating
and highly destructive models are very common and that they increase inequality because
they often use data from the past to determine or to predict the future, which means that
past norms are projected into the future, continuing to disadvantage people who are
already disadvantaged. As she writes, “models are opinions embedded in mathematics”
(p. 21). For example, when credit rating is used by employees to determine which
candidates will be invited in for an interview, those who have had difficulty in the past
(for reasons that may have nothing to do with their qualifications or eventual job
performance) will be disqualified.
From the above description, it would be easy to conclude that we just need to improve our
use of big data, and that we can do so by making sure that models make use of sufficient
data and that algorithms are made transparent. Certainly, there are cases in which such
improvements would be possible. But in the case of identifying underperforming
teachers, it is not really clear it would be possible. O’Neil is arguing that the danger of big
data use is not just that it gets used in contexts in which it should not, but, more
perniciously perhaps, (1) it gets used because of the assumption that mathematics is
somehow objective and value neutral and (2) its use is not questioned because of the
widely shared belief that mathematics is something that cannot be understood. And these
are the issues that feel to me highly relevant to mathematics education research. If O’Neil
is right, the threat to democracy has something very significant to do with our failures in
the mathematics classroom.

TME, vol. 20, nos. 1, 2 & 3, p.136

The first issue raised by O’Neil’s book is one that has been addressed extensively in the
research literature, particularly by scholars working by focusing on social justice issues
(see, for example, Gutstein and Peterson, 2013). However, despite the growing size of
such research, it is still dwarfed by studies that fall in the Predict and Understand
paradigms identified by Stinson and Walshaw (2017), rather than in the Emancipate and
Deconstruct ones, which tend to investigate how mathematical meanings and values are
legitimised, as well as how certain forms of knowledge are privileged or marginalised. So,
it could be argued that more such research needs to be done. This might lead to more
opportunities for teachers and students to learn about the various ways in which
mathematics can be used to oppress and to silence, as well as to celebrate and to
recompense.
In many ways, the book should have been titled ‘Weapons of statistics destruction’. O’Neil
provides examples of statistical errors that have occurred in the past, sometimes with
terrible consequences. From this point of view, it may be that statistical literacy is what is
needed, something which some Canadian provinces (such as Ontario) recognised early
on, while others (e.g. British Columbia) still have not. The more recent push for
computational literacy, which has come in the form of provisions for more coding
experiences in K–12 schooling, seems to have eclipsed statistics literacy, and may even go
on to overtake mathematics as the gatekeeping discipline. However, none of the existing
K–12 curricula in Canada seem to have an ethical or social responsibility component to
their coding courses, which means we will most likely replicate the current situation. That
said, there is little leadership from university computer science departments on this issue.
O’Neil’s second point is just as troubling, as it depends on the fact that too many people
do not feel that they can question mathematical formulas or models. This may be about
insufficient knowledge, but it is likely also to be much more dependent on mathematical
anxiety: when people see numbers, they look the other way. We are not producing
mathematically literate citizens who see it as their right to understand the mathematics
that is determining more and more aspects of their lives. Can we really afford to wait for
a whole new generation of students? Similarly, can we really afford to continue to allow
financial and technology industries to gobble up all of the extremely mathematically
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literate students graduating from universities? What courses could they be taking that
would entice them to use their mathematical talent towards enhancing a more just
society?
Indeed, for Stengers (2018), the fact that there are weapons of math destruction is a
consequence of the long-standing mistrust and lack of communication between the (hard)
sciences—which are the “thinking, rational brain of humanity”—and the (soft)
humanities. Even though many universities now require science students (although not
mathematicians, nor computer scientists) to learn something about the epistemology and
history of science, what they learn is often forgotten. Stengers believes this is, in part,
because, “they have learned that the sciences allow problems to be ‘well-posed’ and
therefore amenable to being given the ‘right solution’” (p. 11). Brown (1993) offered a very
similar critique of mathematics education and its false ‘aesthetic unity’ that refuses to
acknowledge the complex, value-laden and changing nature of problems in the real world.
Stengers argues that scientists need more intentionality to refuse to have their expertise
used against the concerns of the public and must avoid spreading the belief that scientific
progress will resolve all of society’s problems. In the context of WMDs, Stengers would
urge mathematicians to engage more openly and with the public in making clear what
kind of knowledge it is capable of producing.

References
Brown, S. (1993). Towards a pedagogy of confusion. In A. White (Ed.), Essays in Humanistic Mathematics (pp. 107–121). Washington, DC: The Mathematical Association
of America.
Gutstein, E., & Peterson, B. (Eds.) (2013). Rethinking mathematics: Teaching social
justice by the numbers (2nd edn). Milwaukee, WI: Rethinking Schools.
Noble, S. (2018). Algorithms of oppression: How search engines reinforce racism. New
York, NY: New York University Press.
O’Neil, C. (2016). Weapons of Math Destruction. New York, NY: Crown.
Stengers, I. (2018). Another science is possible: A manifesto for slow science (S.
Muecke, trans.). Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Stinson, D. & Walshow, M. (2017). Exploring different theoretical frontiers for different
(and uncertain) possibilities in mathematics education research. In J. Cai (Ed.),

TME, vol. 20, nos. 1, 2 & 3, p.138

Compendium for research in mathematics education (pp. 128–155). Reston, VA:
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics.
Université de Montréal / Research. Montreal Declaration for a Responsible
Development of Artificial Intelligence - La recherche - Université de Montréal.
(2018). Retrieved from https://recherche.umontreal.ca/english/strategicinitiatives/montreal-declaration-for-a-responsible-ai/

